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A Catastrophic Conundrum, But Not a
Nuisance: Why the Judicial Branch is
Ill-Suited to Set Emissions Restrictions on
Domestic Energy Producers Through the
Common Law Nuisance Doctrine
Matthew Hall*
Touted as a landmark decision reviving a legal theory once
essentially left for dead, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
recently reversed a district court order dismissing a lawsuit
brought by eight states, New York City and several private land
trusts against six major energy producers, alleging that the energy
producers’ carbon dioxide emissions constituted an actionable
nuisance.1 In its opinion, the court suggested that the judicial
branch can set limits on carbon dioxide emissions of such
producers without legislative action under the federal common
law nuisance doctrine.2
The harmful nature of greenhouse gases is approaching a
point of being scientifically beyond dispute and dramatic action
needs to be taken to prevent calamitous consequences. However,
this article will argue that any determination of precisely how
such harmful pollutants should be regulated is beyond the reach
of the judicial branch through the common law doctrine of
nuisance, and must come instead from the elected officials of the
coordinate branches of government.
This is not to suggest, however, that the Second Circuit’s
decision cannot be of use in the battle against global warming.
The threat of emissions caps created by the judiciary through
piecemeal litigation could be precisely the motivation that
Congress—and the energy lobby—needs to enact uniform,
widespread emissions reduction policies.

* Riggs, Abney, Neal, Turpen, Orbison & Lewis, Denver, CO. J.D. (2007), Loyola
Law School, Los Angeles.
1 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
2 Id. at 315.
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INTRODUCTION
Persistent Congressional and Executive inaction in
regulating harmful carbon dioxide emissions, particularly from
energy producers, has forced the hand of the judicial branch.
Many countries agree that something needs to be done soon, in
order to mitigate the potentially calamitous consequences of
global climate change. 3 However, widespread regulation of
harmful emissions requires the setting of policy—specifically, a
determination of how the United States should value global
environmental interests relative to its own economic interests.
The courts of this country are not the appropriate forum in which
to resolve these complex policy issues.
In an attempt to achieve what Congress and the President
have not been able to, the concept of suing large emitters of
carbon dioxide under the common law nuisance doctrine was
contemplated several years ago.4 After an outright defeat of this
strategy at the district court level in the Second Circuit in 2005
on grounds that the political question doctrine prohibited the
courts from intervening in the global warming debate at this
juncture,5 the nuisance route seemed untenable. However, with
a single decision, the Second Circuit revived the nuisance
doctrine as a potentially viable means for addressing climate
change.6
In Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., the Second
Circuit held that courts are not precluded by the political
question doctrine from granting injunctive relief, including
potentially setting specific emissions restrictions on domestic
emitters of carbon dioxide, to plaintiffs claiming damages caused
by global warming.7 The court reasoned that, because its holding
was limited to the six energy producing entities identified as
defendants in the lawsuit, it was not engaged in setting any sort
of national policy on emissions reductions.8
While reasonable minds agree that action must be taken on
climate change, taking such action via the common law nuisance
doctrine presents serious problems, both under Article III
standing and the political question doctrine.

3 Richard Black, 55 countries send UN their carbon-curbing plans, BBC NEWS, Feb.
1, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8492450.stm.
4 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
5 Id. at 265, 267.
6 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 315.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 325.
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In order to have standing, a plaintiff must bring grievances
before a court which could be redressed through an order of that
court.9 Unlike previous environmental disputes adjudicated by
the courts involving pollution from a specific source damaging a
particular river or airspace, 10 global warming is a worldwide
Simply limiting the
issue with countless contributors. 11
emissions of six domestic energy companies, as the Second
Circuit has seemingly allowed for, 12 is extremely unlikely to
redress any harm caused by global warming.
Instead, a
comprehensive, international policy is needed to curb the tide of
human-induced climate change.
However, the judicial branch cannot be the body which sets
any sort of broad based policy on global warming. To begin with,
it can be argued that Congress has already spoken on the
appropriate timing for the implementation of any emissions
restrictions on domestic energy producers. 13 Both houses of
Congress separately urged that no emissions restrictions be
agreed to absent a comprehensive global agreement by which
other nations, including developing countries, agree to reduce
their own emissions accordingly. 14 The theory behind such a
policy would be that enacting domestic restrictions prior to
completing negotiations on a global agreement would reduce the
President’s bargaining power in seeking emission reduction
concessions from other nations. Congress likewise enacted
legislation prohibiting domestic enforcement of the Kyoto
Protocol on the grounds that it does not require developing
nations to reduce their emissions.15 If Congress has announced a
policy of refraining from restricting domestic emissions absent a
global agreement, any decision from the judiciary in
contravention of this policy would be prohibited by the political
question doctrine.16
Even if Congress has yet to announce an official policy
stance, the judicial branch would run afoul of the political

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
See, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co.,
206 U.S. 230 (1907).
11 See U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY
STATISTICS, 2006 TOTAL CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS FROM THE CONSUMPTION OF ENERGY
(2006), http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=90&pid=44&aid=8
(last visited Mar. 2, 2010) (showing carbon dioxide emissions from recognized nations
throughout the world).
12 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 314–15.
13 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-474 (I), Purpose and Summary (1992); S. Res. 98, 105th
Cong. (1997).
14 Id.
15 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp.2d 265, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
16 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). See also discussion infra Part II.B.1.
9
10

Do Not Delete

268

4/14/2010 5:42 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 13:265

question doctrine should it attempt to set a broad based
emissions reduction policy.
The political question doctrine
prohibits the judicial branch from issuing decisions which would
require an “initial policy determination” of a kind not ordinarily
made by the courts.17 In order to create carbon dioxide emission
restrictions, the judicial branch would be charged with making
numerous value-based policy decisions.18 These policy decisions
would include whether the United States, as a nation, should
commit to emissions restrictions for energy producers before a
global accord is reached, and if so, the court would be required to
weigh domestic economic interests against the need for emissions
reductions to determine the appropriate schedule and degree of
the required reductions.19 In fact, the inordinate policy setting
that would be required by a court in this context would exceed
even those decisions made by courts widely accused of
demonstrating unrestrained judicial activism—the New Deal era
court and the Warren Court. 20 Through comparison to the
“activist” decisions of these courts, it becomes apparent that
judicial creation and implementation of emissions restrictions for
domestic energy producers would be extraordinary action for the
judicial branch to undertake.
In short, the judicial branch is faced with a conundrum in its
attempts to set emission standards: if it attempts to set
widespread policy, it runs afoul of the political question doctrine,
but it if tries to narrowly tailor emissions restrictions to a given
defendant, the impact of the decision would be so slight on the
consequences of global warming that the redressability prong of
traditional Article III standing analysis cannot be met. As such,
the only appropriate means by which to regulate carbon dioxide
or other greenhouse gas emissions is through the other
coordinate branches of government.
However, despite the fact that cases using the nuisance
doctrine to set emissions policies may not be legally sound and
may not survive the scrutiny of the Supreme Court, they can still
serve a useful role in encouraging the legislative and executive
branches to take action in order to prevent piecemeal carbon
dioxide emission regulations at the hands of the judicial branch.
In fact, this may have been the subtle intention of the Second
Circuit in issuing its recent decision in Connecticut v. American
Electric Power Co.21
17
18
19
20
21

Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272–73. See also infra Part II.B.2.
See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
See P ETER W OLL, P UBLIC P OLICY 223–29 (1974).
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
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Part I of this article sets forth the Second Circuit’s reasoning
in reaching its decision, specifically focusing on the types of
environmental disputes that the court cites as evidence that
nuisance is an appropriate means for resolving this case. The
majority of the authorities cited by the court involve specific acts
of pollution contained in a finite geographical area which, on
their own, provably caused or were sufficiently likely to cause
harm to the plaintiff.
Part II discusses the critical differences between the nature
of the previous environmental disputes successfully resolved by
courts and cited by the American Electric Power Co. Court and
the present dispute involving carbon dioxide emissions which
place carbon dioxide emission standards in the realm of nonjusticiable political questions.
Rather than specific and
geographically finite acts of pollution that result in readily
attributable harm subject to redressability, harmful carbon
dioxide emissions are a worldwide problem requiring a global (or
at least national) solution. This posits an unsolvable conundrum
for the courts. The political question doctrine precludes the
judicial branch from imposing emission restrictions that are
sufficiently widespread to result in meaningful reductions or
postponements of the consequences of global warming, but
anything short of meaningful reductions or postponements
prevents litigants claiming injuries under nuisance laws from
having standing to assert their claims.
Part III argues that even though the reasoning in this
opinion should not withstand further scrutiny, it can still serve
an important purpose in encouraging the legislative branch to act
in setting emission restriction policies. Perhaps this was in fact
the primary intent of the Second Circuit in issuing its decision
after acknowledging that global warming is a serious problem
that requires prompt and unified action.
I. THE REVIVAL OF THE COMMON LAW NUISANCE DOCTRINE IN
THE GLOBAL WARMING DEBATE: CONNECTICUT V. AMERICAN
ELECTRIC POWER CO.
On September 21, 2009, more than three years after
argument, the Second Circuit issued its decision in Connecticut v.
American Electric Power Co.22 Plaintiffs—eight states, New York
22 582 F.3d 309. Interestingly, a rare two-judge panel of the Second Circuit issued
the decision. The case was originally assigned to the two deciding judges, along with
Justice (then Judge) Sonia Sotomayor. Justice Sotomayor was promoted to the United
States Supreme Court before this case was decided, making her unable to participate in
the decision. Since the two remaining judges agreed on the result, the decision was
issued by the two remaining judges rather than be reassigned to a new panel. Id. at 314.
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City and three private land trusts—sued six major electric power
companies which operate fossil-fuel-fire power plants in twenty
states, alleging that the defendants’ carbon dioxide emissions
constituted a nuisance in that they contributed to global
warming and its harmful effects. 23 Plaintiffs’ objective in
bringing the suit was to force the defendants to “cap and then
reduce their carbon dioxide emissions,” which Plaintiffs alleged
were causing damages to their interests.24 Plaintiffs identified
both present and future harms attributable to global warming,
including the reduction of snow mass in California (and
corresponding reduction in water for the State), respiratory
problems for residents, beach erosion and coastal flooding.25 The
Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s determination that
the political question doctrine serves as a bar to judicial
resolution of the lawsuit, and further held that Plaintiffs had
sufficiently demonstrated standing to pursue their nuisance
claims.26
A. The Second Circuit’s Political Question Doctrine Analysis
In analyzing the application of the political question doctrine
to this case, the Second Circuit turned to the six factors set forth
in Baker v. Carr:
[(1)] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or [(2)] a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [(3)] the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [(4)] the impossibility of a
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [(5)] an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or [(6)] the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.27

Some pundits have speculated that the case, which was decided by the District Court in
2005, was purposefully delayed until after Sotomayor’s promotion to the Supreme Court
to make her confirmation an easier process. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Questions Arise About
Long Delay by Sotomayor-Led Panel in Climate Case, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, May
29, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202431051311.
23 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 310, 314.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 317–18.
26 Id. at 315. The court further held that Plaintiffs’ claims were not displaced by
existing federal law. Id. While this holding may present its own issues, they are outside
the scope of this article.
27 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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After noting that Baker “set a high bar for nonjusticiability,” the
court explained why each Baker factor is inapplicable to the
issues presented.28
The first factor, a textual constitutional commitment to a
coordinate political department, was quickly dismissed as an
untenable argument by the court.29 Defendants argued that the
first factor was applicable based on the commerce clause and
executive powers.30 As to the commerce clause, the court declined
to consider the argument as it was “insufficiently argued” and
thereby waived. 31 As to executive powers, defendants argued
that judicial intervention would usurp the executive’s authority
to “resolve fundamental [global] policy questions,” thereby
impermissibly interfering with the executive’s right to manage
foreign relations. 32 The court rejected this argument, holding
that Plaintiffs sought only to limit the emissions from six energy
producers, not set global policy on climate change.33
The second factor, a lack of judicially-discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving the case, was likewise clearly
rejected by the court.34 Defendants argued that the uncertainties
surrounding the impact of greenhouse gases render judicial
intervention, particularly in the form of setting emission
The court responded to this
standards, unmanageable. 35
argument by noting that “federal courts have successfully
adjudicated complex common law nuisance cases for over a
century.”36 For instance, the court cited cases in which courts
reached the merits: Missouri sued to prevent Illinois from
dumping sewage into a channel that emptied into the Missouri
River above St. Louis; 37 Georgia sued to stop a Tennessee
company’s “noxious emissions” from continuing to harm Georgian
forests and crops;38 and New Jersey sued to prevent New York
City from dumping trash into the ocean, causing New Jersey
waters and beaches to become polluted. 39 These disputes, the
court reasoned, required judicial determinations of complex
scientific issues as to the harm or prospective harm caused by
Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 321–32.
Id. at 324–25.
30 Id. at 324.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 325.
34 Id. at 326–29.
35 Id. at 326.
36 Id.
37 Id. (citing Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906)).
38 Id. at 327 (citing Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Georgia v.
Tenn. Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915)).
39 Id. (citing New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931)).
28
29
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purported environmental pollutants.40 Just as those courts were
able to wade through the complexities to make reasoned
decisions, so too, concluded the court, could it do with respect to
carbon dioxide emissions.41
As to the third Baker factor, the impossibility of deciding the
case without an “initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion,” defendants argued, and the District
Court agreed, that the “very nature of [global warming] requires
a comprehensive response” which specifically requires the
decision of whether to adopt a policy limiting greenhouse gas
emissions. 42 Defendants further argued that Congress has
contemplated such limits, calling for further study of the
propriety of such action, but to date has refrained from enacting
any specific policy.43 According to defendants and the District
Court, the judicial branch cannot act without this initial policy
determination from the legislative branch.44 The court minimized
the importance of Congress’ “refusal to legislate,” citing Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I)45 for the proposition that, where
a gap exists in a federal regulatory scheme, common law exists to
fill those gaps.46
Milwaukee I specifically dealt with a water pollution
abatement remedy sought by the State of Illinois not expressly
covered by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act or any other
federal environmental statutes.47 The Milwaukee I Court, like
Plaintiffs in this case, turned to federal common law nuisance to
authorize the remedy sought.48 The court further noted that a
plaintiff should not be required to wait until comprehensive
legislation has been enacted covering the specific grievance
alleged.49 Further, the court stated that ordinary tort suits do
not require any initial policy determination that would be
problematic under Baker, and that this nuisance action was
consistent with an ordinary tort suit.50

Id. at 327.
Id. at 328–29.
42 Id. at 330; Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272–73
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
43 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 330.
44 Id. at 331.
45 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
46 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 330.
47 Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 103–04.
48 Id. at 107.
49 Id. at 101–04; Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 331.
50 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 331 (citing McMahon v. Presidential Airways,
Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1365 (11th Cir. 2007)).
40
41
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Finally, the court lumped the discussion of the fourth, fifth
and sixth Baker factors together, deciding that all three factors
are premised on some existing policy which might lead to
uncertainty or inconsistent results.51 The court held that there is
no unified United States policy on greenhouse gas emissions.52
While recognizing the “political overtones” of issues concerning
global warming, because there is no identifiable policy that would
be violated or contradicted by a decision from the judicial branch,
the court ultimately concluded that these Baker factors likewise
were not implicated.53
B. The Second Circuit’s Standing Analysis
Despite the fact that the court held that its decision was not
creating any national or global policy and was limited solely to
the twelve plaintiffs and six defendants, the court nonetheless
found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently demonstrated standing
to pursue their nuisance claims.54
The court began its standing analysis by questioning
whether the 2007 Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v.
EPA 55 eliminated the need for traditional Article III standing
requirements (injury in fact, causation and redressability) when
a State sues as parens patriae—that is, on behalf of its injured
citizens.56 Concluding that the matter was an open question, the
court proceeded to analyze standing in this case under both the
parens patriae approach and the standard Article III
formulations. 57 Of particular interest to this article is the
traditional Article III standing issue, and most importantly, the
issue of redressability.58

Id. at 331–32.
Id.
Id. at 332.
54 Id. at 314–15.
55 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
56 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 336–37.
57 Id. at 338–39.
58 While the Second Circuit described the state of the law regarding whether
traditional Article III standing analysis is required for states suing as parens patriae as
an open question, the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007),
found it necessary to apply the traditional elements of injury in fact, causation and
redressability in spite of any analysis under a parens patriae theory. Moreover, the
article cited by the Am. Electric Power Co. Court in its opinion, Bradford Mank, Should
States Have Greater Standing Rights Than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s
New Standing Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701 (2008), concludes that the
parens patriae analysis provides for a slackened application of the traditional elements,
but applies them nonetheless. Although outside the subject of this paper, this author
would posit that the parens patriae analysis takes the place of the “injury in fact” prong of
the traditional analysis, leaving the remainder of the traditional analysis in tact. In any
event, the Second Circuit held that the private land trust plaintiffs, who do not fit under
51
52
53
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As the court noted, a showing of redressability requires “a
substantial likelihood that the requested relief will remedy the
alleged injury in fact.” 59 Defendants essentially argued that
because they contribute such a small amount on a global scale to
the causes of global warming, alleged to be “2.5% of man-made
carbon dioxide emissions,” capping their emissions would not
prevent or reduce the harm and future harm alleged by
Plaintiffs. 60 The Court summarily rejected this argument,
stating that Massachusetts v. EPA foreclosed this argument by
holding that the EPA’s failure to regulate United States
automobile emissions which contribute to global warning was
redressable because even of the remedy sought would not “by
itself reverse global warming,” but would “slow or reduce it.”61
Likewise, the court reasoned, reducing upwards of 2.5 percent of
total man-made carbon dioxide emissions would slow or reduce
the effects of global warming, and concluded the injury claimed
was redressable through the remedy sought, reduction of
defendants’ emissions.62
II. JUDICIAL CREATION OF EMISSIONS STANDARDS IS EITHER TOO
INSUBSTANTIAL TO CONFER ARTICLE III STANDING OR SO
PERVASIVE AS TO RUN AFOUL OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE
The Second Circuit in American Electric Power Co. found
itself in an impossible position. The court was forced to try and
delicately avoid the political question doctrine by attempting to
describe its holding as narrow and independent of any initial
policy determination regarding balancing environmental and
economic interests of United States carbon dioxide emitters,
while at the same time making clear that its decision would
redress the claimed injuries and future injuries caused by global
warming. As is apparent from the court’s decision, this balance
cannot adequately be struck.

the parens patriae analysis, also had standing, making the traditional standing analysis
relevant regardless of the final answer on parens patriae standing requirements.
59 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 347 (quoting Jana-Rock Const., Inc. v. N.Y. State
Dep’t of Econ. Dev., 438 F.3d 195, 204 (2d Cir. 2006)).
60 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 347.
61 Id. at 348 (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007)).
62 Id. at 349.
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A. In Order to Meaningfully Redress Injuries Caused by Global
Warming, a Unified, Widespread Emissions Reduction Policy
is Needed.
In order for a litigant to have standing to pursue a claim,
that litigant must show that she suffered an injury in fact caused
by the complained of conduct that would be redressable by the
relief requested from the court.63 There must be “a substantial
likelihood that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury
in fact.”64 “[A] plaintiff satisfies the redressability requirement
when he shows that a favorable decision will relieve a discrete
injury to himself. He need not show that a favorable decision will
relieve his every injury.”65
Global warming and its consequences are an environmental
problem different than any the judicial branch has previously
dealt with. 66 As noted above, the Second Circuit justified its
conclusion that the judicial branch was suited to adjudicate this
kind of dispute and could redress the injuries claimed in this case
in large part on the fact that courts had previously resolved
“complex” environmental problems, including various cases
involving the effects of pollution.67 These pollution cases include
the dumping of sewage into a river, 68 noxious fumes from a
factory damaging nearby crops and forests,69 and the dumping of
garbage into the ocean, which washed up on the shores of a
neighboring state.70
However, these examples all involved a specific act of
pollution directly damaging a protectable interest. If sewage
going into a river is damaging interests downstream, it seems
simple enough to conclude that stopping the dumping will
prevent the damage. Global warming is unique in that it does
not fit this model.
Global warming is a global problem. While an individual
emitter of carbon dioxide is undoubtedly contributing to the
problem on some level, any individual contribution is likely so
minimal as to have no measurable effect in terms of the injury
causing consequences such as warming and sea level rise. The

63
64

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
Jana-Rock Const. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Econ. Dev., 438 F.3d 195, 204 (2d Cir.

2006).
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 n.15 (1982).
See, e.g., infra note 71.
Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 326–27.
Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co.,
237 U.S. 474 (1915).
70 New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931).
65
66
67
68
69
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change concluded in its
Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report that even if every
developed nation in the world reduced its emissions by 2 percent
per year from 2000 through 2010, global warming and sea level
rise would only be diminished by a “small amount” by the year
Moreover, the 2007 Synthesis Report anticipates
2030. 71
greenhouse gas increases of 25–90 percent between 2000 and
As further evidence of
2030 absent mitigation efforts. 72
recognition of the insufficiency of a one-time 2.5 percent (or less)
reduction, it should be noted that the American Clean Energy
and Security Act of 2009 (commonly referred to as the WaxmanMarkey bill) recently passed by the House of Representatives
with a competing bill expected sometime in the near future from
the Senate, calls for an 83 percent reduction from 2005 levels in
all domestic carbon dioxide emissions by 2050.73
Imagine, then, reducing not the emissions of every developed
nation in the world, but instead allowing the emissions of all
developed and developing nations to go unchecked and continue
to grow while reducing only the emissions from six discrete
companies within the United States. Clearly, some greater
scheme than this is required to have any measurable impact on
global warming or sea level rise, the factors causing the injuries
complained of in American Electric Power Co.
In attempting to avoid this problem, the court in American
Electric Power Co. brushed aside the issue of redressability,
holding that Massachusetts v. EPA foreclosed the argument that
the impact of emissions regulations could be too insignificant to
redress injuries stemming from those emissions.74 However, the
facts in Massachusetts are substantially different than the issue
facing the court in American Electric Power Co.
To begin with, Massachusetts concerned not the judicial
branch imposing specific limitations on select energy producers,
but rather whether the EPA had an obligation to regulate
emissions from motor vehicles across the entire United States.75
It has been estimated that United States motor vehicle emissions
constitute upwards of 6 percent of the world’s carbon dioxide

71 THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 2001 SYNTHESIS REPORT,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY QUESTION 6 98 (2001), available at http://www.grida.no/climate/
ipcc_tar/vol4/english/pdf/q1to9.pdf.
72 THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf.
73 H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 702 (2009).
74 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 349 (2d Cir. 2009).
75 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
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emissions contributing to global warming.76 Not only is this close
to three times the amount of emissions directly at stake in the
litigation in American Electric Power Co., but also the fact that
the EPA was the defendant in Massachusetts rather than
individual emitters is a critical distinction. As the Supreme
Court noted in Massachusetts: “Agencies, like legislatures, do not
generally resolve massive problems in one fell regulatory swoop.
They instead whittle away over time, refining their preferred
approach as circumstances change and as they develop a more
nuanced understanding of how best to proceed.”77
In other words, the Supreme Court was acknowledging that
even the impact of regulating all new automobiles in the United
States was likely insufficient on its own to have a meaningful
impact on the injuries caused by global warming, but recognized
that the EPA, as the agency charged with implementing the
Clean Air Act and regulating various emissions standards could,
over time, design a comprehensive policy that would be
substantial enough to make a dent in the effects of global
warming. It is in this context that the remaining language in the
court’s opinion must be read.
The court in American Electric Power Co. relied heavily
(indeed, almost exclusively) on the Supreme Court’s language in
Massachusetts that redressability was not defeated merely
because the regulation of emission standards for new
automobiles could not “by itself reverse global warming” because
it could “slow or reduce it.”78 The American Electric Power Co.
court found the emissions of the six energy producers analogous
to the emissions of new motor vehicles across the United States.79
However, the analogy does not hold when the Massachusetts
language is taken in context.
Where the EPA is the defendant rather than individual
emitters, it follows that an initial step in creating a
comprehensive policy might be sufficient to meet the Article III
standing requirement of redressability. The EPA was directed by
Congress to create and implement climate change initiatives in
76 Id. at 1457–58. See also U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, 2006 TOTAL
CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS FROM THE CONSUMPTION OF ENERGY, supra note 11 (showing
that the United States produced approximately 20.3 percent of the world’s carbon dioxide
emissions). See also U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 2006 U.S. EMISSIONS
INVENTORY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8 (2006), available at http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/emissions/downloads/08_ES.pdf (noting that 33 percent of U.S. man-made
carbon dioxide emissions come from transportation activities, with 60 percent of
transportation emissions coming from personal car use).
77 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1457.
78 Id. at 1458.
79 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 378.
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order to successfully reduce the impact of global warming.80 In
this manner, regulating new motor vehicle emissions would not
completely alleviate the consequences of global warming, but it
begins to “whittle away” at the overarching global problem. 81
Given that Congress directed the EPA to take action, it is
perfectly conceivable that new motor vehicle emissions
restrictions were just the first phase of a broader policy
envisioned by Congress to be enacted over time, as the
legislature “develop[s] a more nuanced understanding of how
best to proceed” in tackling the imposing problem of global
warming.82
Judicial imposition of emission restrictions on individual
emitters, by contrast, cannot be said to be the initial step in some
larger comprehensive scheme. Unlike the EPA, courts are not
charged with creating an emissions reduction scheme. While a
single court decision directed toward individual emitters would
reduce the amount of global emissions by some insignificant
amount, that court cannot on its own take any future steps in
order to continue to whittle away at the massive problem that is
global warming.83
Without the scenario presented in Massachusetts, where an
agency is compelled by Congress to take the first step in creating
a presumably broader emissions reduction policy, the
independently insignificant act of requiring six individual
emitters to reduce their emissions is insufficient to satisfy the
redressability prong of the standing analysis. Gone is the
justification of “whittling away” at a larger problem by taking a
small initial step. All that remains is a single, independent
remedy devoid of any practical significance that fails to redress
the complained of injuries.
Therefore, in order for the judicial branch to sufficiently
redress an injury caused by global warming, that court (or
multiple courts through piecemeal litigation directed at specific
individual emitters) would have to enact a broad based emissions
scheme sufficient to make some measureable impact on the
ramifications of global warming. There are two means by which
this might be accomplished: (1) a single court (perhaps the
Supreme Court) setting forth a uniform policy of emission
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006).
See id. See also supra notes 77 and 78.
See supra notes 77 and 78.
That is to say, courts are at the mercy of plaintiffs who bring disputes before them
pursuant to the case or controversy requirement, and cannot independently pursue any
sort of larger agenda, as could a legislative or authorized administrative body. U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2.
80
81
82
83
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reductions for energy producers; or (2) gradual piecemeal
litigation directed toward specific energy producers in multiple
courts which eventually impose specific restrictions on all (or
virtually all) major energy producers. However, both of these
methods are problematic, due to the political question doctrine,
as discussed below.
B. In Order to Enact a Sufficiently Widespread Emissions
Reduction Scheme to Redress Injuries Caused by Global
Warming, Courts Would Have to Resolve a Non-Justiciable
Political Question
“The political question doctrine excludes from judicial review
those controversies which revolve around policy choices and
value determinations constitutionally committed to the halls of
Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.” 84 The
doctrine is “designed to restrain the Judiciary from inappropriate
interference in the business of the other branches of
Government.” 85 In 1962, the Supreme Court set forth six
categories of non-justiciable political questions (the Baker
factors):
[(1)] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or [(2)] a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [(3)] the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [(4)] the impossibility of a
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [(5)] an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or [(6)] the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.86

Should a court (or multiple courts, though a series of
piecemeal litigation directed at specific energy producers) decide
to create a uniform, across the board policy to avoid the
redressability problem discussed above, it would run afoul of the
political question doctrine under either the third87 or the fourth,
fifth and sixth Baker factors88 depending on whether Congress
has sufficiently expressed a policy on regulating energy producer

84
85
86
87
88

Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990).
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
See infra Part II.B.2.
See infra Part II.B.1.
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emissions to date. Notably, the creation of such a policy likely
would not contravene the first Baker factor.89
Arguably, Congress has already made an initial policy
determination inconsistent with the judicial branch setting
emission restrictions on domestic energy producers prior to a
global agreement being reached.90 If this is the case, the judicial
branch is precluded from setting emissions limitations before
such an agreement is reached. If, on the other hand, Congress
has not sufficiently expressed such a policy on domestic energy
producers, then an initial policy determination must be made.
Courts are prohibited from making such a determination by the
third Baker factor.91 In either case, the judiciary runs afoul of
the political question doctrine under either the third or the
fourth, fifth and sixth Baker factors, but not under the first
Baker factor.92
1.

If Congress Has Sufficiently Expressed a Policy on
Regulating Emissions of Domestic Energy Producers,
Judicial Intervention Establishing Such Standards
Conflicts with that Policy in Violation of the Fourth,
Fifth and Sixth Baker Factors
The fourth, fifth and sixth Baker factors depend on the
existence of a policy expressed by a coequal branch of
government which would be contradicted by a court’s decision in
a particular case. 93 If such a policy is in existence, and the
court’s decision would in some way undermine that policy, the
court may be presented with a non-justiciable political question
and be forced to refrain from issuing an opinion on the merits.94
Arguably, Congress has already set forth a policy on
regulating domestic emissions. Congress is no stranger to the
debate over global climate change policy. In 1987, Congress
enacted the Global Climate Act of 1987, which compelled the
Secretary of State to engage in global negotiations on climate
change on behalf of the United States.95 In 1992, the House of
Representatives weighed whether to enact domestic emissions
restrictions and specifically found that domestic emissions
reduction action should only be taken “in the context of concerted

See infra Part II.B.2.
H.R. REP. NO. 102-474 (I), Purpose and Summary (1992); S. Res. 98, 105th Cong.
(1997). See also infra Part II.A.1.
91 See infra Part II.B.2.
92 See infra Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2.
93 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 331 (2d Cir. 2009).
94 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
95 15 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006).
89
90
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international action.” 96 Through the negotiations authorized
under the Global Climate Act of 1987, the United States entered,
with ratification by the Senate, the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was designed
to achieve a global accord as to how to best handle climate
change. 97 The fruit of the UNFCCC was the Kyoto Protocol,
which President Clinton signed in 1997, but was never presented
to the Senate for ratification. 98 Had the Kyoto Protocol been
presented to the Senate, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests it
would not have been ratified; also in 1997, the Senate passed a
resolution with a 95-0 vote urging President Clinton not to sign
any agreement that did not include emissions restrictions on
developing nations, as the Kyoto Protocol failed to contain. 99
Moreover, Congress subsequently “passed a series of bills that
affirmatively barred the EPA from enforcing the [Kyoto]
Protocol.”100 Based on the resolutions passed separately by each
house of Congress, it appears reasonable to conclude that the
primary objection to the Kyoto Protocol is that it failed to include
a truly global agreement—that is, one that would include
restrictions on both developed and developing nations.
The reasoning that supports the United States refraining
from enacting domestic emissions reductions prior to entering a
true global agreement requiring other nations, including
developing nations, to likewise reduce their emissions is centered
around the United States’ bargaining power in negotiating such
an agreement.101 Presumably, if the United States already had
domestic restrictions on emissions in place, there would remain
less to bargain with in convincing other nations to restrict their
emissions.
This rationale is particularly apt with respect to domestic
energy production.
As of 2006, it was estimated that
approximately 41 percent of the United States’ man-made carbon
dioxide emissions come from energy production. 102 Moreover,
global energy has been projected to increase 60 percent from
2002 levels by 2030, 103 underscoring the importance of energy
production emissions to any global agreement.
If these

H.R. REP. NO. 102-474 (I), Purpose and Summary (1992).
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 269. (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
98 Id.
99 S. RES. 98, 105th Cong. (1997).
100 Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 269.
101 S. RES. 98, 105th Cong. (1997).
102 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 2006 U.S. EMISSIONS INVENTORY,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 76, at 8.
103 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD OUTLOOK 2004, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 31
(2004), http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/WEO2004SUM.pdf.
96
97
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emissions, bound to be a major component of any comprehensive
agreement, are restricted before the President sits down with the
international community to negotiate a global solution, the
concessions available for the President to offer (and hence, the
concessions the President can seek in return) would be severely
limited. This is of particular concern with respect to India and
China, who are rapidly ascending the list of largest global
polluters 104 as well as assuming the role of major economic
competitors with the United States.105
If the 1992 House Report, 1997 Senate Resolution, and
subsequent legislation by both houses of Congress preventing
domestic enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol are sufficient to
establish a policy that no comprehensive emission reduction
scheme be enacted absent a global agreement requiring
developing nations to likewise reduce their emissions, any court
opinion or series of court opinions imposing mandatory emissions
reductions would conflict with this policy. Certainly, a court
decision that directly contradicts an existing policy of the
legislative branch would implicate the fourth, fifth, and sixth
Baker factors and therefore contravene the political question
doctrine.106
However, the issue of whether Congress has expressed an
official policy on global warming is far from settled. Two major
clouds hover, preventing clarity on this issue. Specifically, (1)
both houses of Congress have never come together to pass
legislation explicitly setting forth this policy; and (2) Congress
has passed other legislation authorizing emissions restrictions on
certain industries.107
The best evidence to date of Congress’ intention not to pass
comprehensive domestic emissions restrictions until a global
agreement is reached appears through a House Report and a
Senate Resolution. 108 However, as the Report and Resolution
express only a non-binding opinion of one house of Congress and
are not subject to a vote in the other house or any action by the
President, it is difficult to conclude that any official policy has
been set forth. It seems the only information available confirms
104 U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, 2006 TOTAL CARBON DIOXIDE
EMISSIONS FROM THE CONSUMPTION OF ENERGY, supra note 11 (reporting that as of 2006,
China and India were the first and fourth largest emitters, respectively).
105 James G. Neuger, G-8’s Dominance Faces Challenges from China, India,
Bloomberg.com, July 10, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601068
&sid=aQlvD4kX5bE8.
106 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
107 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006).
108 H.R. REP. NO. 102-474 (I), Purpose and Summary (1992); S. RES. 98, 105th Cong.
(1997).
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nothing more than that, as of 1992, the House of Representatives
thought it unwise to enact comprehensive emissions reduction
legislation absent a global agreement compelling developing
nations to likewise reduce emissions to minimize the impact of
global warming, and as of 1997 the Senate reached a similar
consensus.109
The court seized upon this absence of formal legislation
setting forth a policy on emissions reduction in American
Electric. Power Co. As the court noted, “Congress’s mere refusal
to legislate . . . falls far short of an expression of legislative intent
to supplant the existing common law in that area.”110 The court
went on to construe the common law doctrine of nuisance as the
“existing common law” that Congress failed to supplant through
legislative action.111 As the court eventually concluded, it seems
that the fairest interpretation of the dual independent
Resolutions is that they are insufficient to establish a national
policy on emissions restrictions.112
Moreover, Congress has passed legislation authorizing
emissions regulation on other industries, specifically the auto
industry. 113 The Clean Air Act instructed the Environmental
Protection Agency to implement restrictions on new motor
vehicles to make them more environmentally friendly. 114 In
2007, the Supreme Court interpreted the Clean Air Act as giving
Congressional authorization to the E.P.A. to regulate carbon
dioxide emissions from such new vehicles.115 Thus, Congress has
in fact authorized the restriction of a major source of emissions116
in some form without any qualification regarding a global
agreement being reached first. This cuts sharply against any
contention that Congress has expressed a national policy to
refrain from restricting emissions until a global agreement has
been reached. However, the Clean Air Act does not completely
foreclose the argument that a policy exists favoring abstention
from restrictions on the emissions of domestic energy producers,
which account for a larger percentage of U.S. man made carbon

See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 330 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing
United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 535 (1993)).
111 See id. at 331.
112 Id. at 331–32.
113 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006).
114 Id.
115 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1463 (2007).
116 See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 2006 U.S. EMISSIONS INVENTORY,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 76, at 8 (noting that 33 percent of U.S. man-made
carbon dioxide emissions come from transportation activities).
109
110

Do Not Delete

284

4/14/2010 5:42 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 13:265

dioxide than do motor vehicles,117 as the Clean Air Act does not
mandate emissions restrictions of energy producers.118
Notably, although a clear expression of a national policy in
favor of refraining from enacting mandatory domestic emissions
restrictions prior to a global agreement would simplify the
analysis, judicial imposition of such restrictions would violate the
political question doctrine regardless of the existence of such a
policy, as discussed below.
2. If Congress Has Not Sufficiently Expressed a Policy on
Regulating Emissions of Domestic Energy Producers,
Judicial Intervention Establishing Such Standards
Requires an Initial Policy Determination in Violation of
the Third Baker Factor
Even if the court in American Electric Power Co. was correct
in deciding that no policy determination was made by Congress,
judicial regulation of emissions violates the political question
doctrine. If no such policy was established by Congress, a court
deciding to impose emissions restrictions would be required to
make an “initial policy determination” in violation of the third
Baker factor.119
a. Unlike Previous “Direct Pollution” Cases, Global
Warming Requires the Balancing of Numerous
Factors with Far Reaching Global Policy Implications
In the context of water pollution, the Supreme Court held in
1972 that, where existing laws and regulation did not encompass
the specific environmental nuisance alleged by a plaintiff, that
plaintiff was not required to wait for comprehensive legislation to
be enacted specifically outlawing that nuisance in order to bring
a suit for injunctive relief.120 Instead, the plaintiff could proceed
with a common law nuisance action designed to halt the injurious
conduct, despite the fact that future legislation may preempt the
common law with respect to the particular nuisance.121 The court
gave no suggestion of the need to make an initial policy
determination in such a scenario.
However, as referenced above, global climate change
occupies a different realm than direct pollution cases.122 Global
117 Id. (noting that energy production accounts for more than 40 percent of U.S. man
made carbon dioxide emissions, as compared with 33 percent created by transportation).
118 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006).
119 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
120 Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91, 104 (1972).
121 Id. at 107.
122 See supra Part II.A.
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climate change is not nearly as cut and dry as water pollution,
which involves a direct injury attributable to a particular source
and would not ordinarily require the weighing of many complex
factors in constructing a remedy. Any relief sufficient to redress
injuries and future injuries caused by global warming would
require extended consideration of numerous incredibly complex
factors. As the District Court put it in its opinion in Connecticut
v. American Electric Power Co.:
Such relief would, at a minimum, require this Court to: (1) determine
the appropriate level at which to cap the carbon dioxide emissions of
these Defendants; (2) determine the appropriate percentage reduction
to impose upon Defendants; (3) create a schedule to implement those
reductions; (4) determine and balance the implications of such relief
on the United States’ ongoing negotiations with other nations
concerning global climate change; (5) assess and measure available
alternative energy resources; and (6) determine and balance the
implications of such relief on the United States’ energy sufficiency and
thus its national security—all without an “initial policy
determination” having been made by the elected branches.123

Certainly, as spelled out by the District Court, many complex
decisions need to be made in order to set emissions restrictions.
As an initial matter, a court would need to determine whether
domestic emissions should be capped at all, or whether the
economic detriment caused by setting such limits, especially
before any global agreement has been reached, would be too
great to warrant restricting emissions of domestic energy
producers.
The Second Circuit attempted to adjudicate around having to
make an initial policy determination by casting the case before it
as a simple nuisance action that required no policy
considerations. 124 Perhaps, in a vacuum, a court determining
that six energy producers’ emissions contributed to damaging the
interests of the plaintiffs could simply apply the common law
doctrine of nuisance to determine whether injunctive relief was
appropriate without any concern for overarching policy.
However, as discussed above,125 in order for a court to be able to
redress the grievances of such plaintiffs for purposes of Article III
standing where the complained of conduct is a contribution to
global warming, some broader-reaching decision (or series of
decisions) is necessary to confer any meaningful relief on the

123 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2005),
rev’d 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
124 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 331 (2d Cir. 2009) (describing
the lawsuit as “an ordinary tort suit”).
125 See supra Parts I and II for further discussion.
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plaintiffs.126 Any broader decision seems to require consideration
of, at a minimum, the necessary policy determinations set forth
by the District Court in Connecticut v. American Electric Power
Co. 127 As the District Court emphatically and convincingly
established, absent some initial policy determination from the
executive or legislative branches, the judicial branch would be
required to determine whether it is in the best interests of the
United States to restrict emissions of its largest energy producers
before other nations have agreed to respond in kind.128
The wisdom of this far-reaching action would hinge on the
delicate consideration of numerous complex global and domestic
factors that are beyond the scope of question typically reserved
for the judicial branch. Such action would require the judicial
branch to balance concerns including the need for global action in
combating climate change and the degree to which restricting
emissions on domestic energy producers without corresponding
restrictions on foreign energy producers would handicap domestic
economic interests.
This plainly goes far beyond routine
application of longstanding nuisance principles that the Second
Circuit asserted was all that it would be undertaking.
b. While Courts Have Previously Intervened in
Politically Charged Issues, Even Those Courts
Accused of Undertaking Judicial Activism Rarely, If
Ever, Engage in Initial Policy Creation and
Implementation
It is beyond dispute that courts often weigh in, either
explicitly or as a consequence of the decisions that they make, on
certain policy issues. However, the manner in which policy
issues are influenced by the judiciary has historically largely
been limited to decisions upholding, striking down or
interpreting acts of the legislature. For instance, examine the
most significant cases of the courts that commentators often
point to in identifying judicial activism. Two periods of the
Supreme Court’s history are continually identified as particularly
“activist” periods in which the Court ventured into the realm of
determining policy issues: The New Deal era and the Warren
Court.129
Before the New Deal era, the Supreme Court repeatedly
declared legislative attempts to regulate worker rights, including

126
127
128
129

See supra Part II.A for further discussion.
Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272–73.
Id. at 274.
See W OLL , supra note 20, at 220–29.
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setting wage and hour requirements, unconstitutional, holding
that such laws would impermissibly restrict the right to freedom
of contract.130 Following the famed “Switch in Time that Saved
Nine,” the Court suddenly began to uphold regulations setting
maximum hours and minimum wages, overruling its previous
precedents holding the opposite. 131 The Court decided that
freedom of contract was not absolute and could permissibly be
restricted where the restriction would improve health and safety
or protect vulnerable groups.132 In other words, the Court made
a clear policy determination that freedom of contract should yield
to worker protections where health and safety or vulnerable
groups were concerned. However, it should be noted that the
legislature had already made this policy choice in enacting the
health and safety oriented laws in the first place, and so there
was nothing “initial” about any policy determination made by the
Court in these instances.
The Warren Court is likewise frequently cited as being an
“activist” Court for its decisions striking down numerous laws
harmful to minorities and other historically vulnerable groups.133
The Warren Court is perhaps best known for striking down the
“separate but equal” doctrine in schools through Brown v. Board
of Education, 134 predicated on the Court’s determination that
separate educational facilities based on race were inherently
unequal, and thus ran afoul of equal protection. But even this
decision was not setting any sort of initial policy. Instead, it was
a determination that the policy previously set forth via the equal
protection guaranteed by the 14th Amendment was not being
advanced through segregated education. The Warren Court also
recognized a constitutional right to privacy, which it held
outweighed a state’s interest in prohibiting its citizens from
using contraceptives in striking down such a law enacted by the
State of Connecticut.135 While this could be considered a policy
determination of sorts in some respects, the real policy being
advanced by that decision is the Supremacy Clause—the Court in

130 E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down New York’s attempt
to cap bakery workers’ hours at a maximum of 60 per week and 10 per day on grounds
that such a law would impermissibly interfere with the right to freedom of contract).
131 E.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (overruling Adkins
v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), and holding that freedom of contract was not
absolute, and that the right to contract could be permissibly restricted where the
restriction related to health and safety or protection of vulnerable groups).
132 See id. at 394.
133 Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Judicial Restraint of the Warren Court (and Why it
Matters), 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 255, 255 (2008) (noting that the Warren Court is “virtually
synonymous with the term ‘judicial activism’”).
134 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
135 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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effect prohibited a state from enacting a law that, in the Court’s
view, conflicted with the Constitution. Advancement of such a
policy did not require any “initial” policy determination by the
Court, as the Supremacy Clause is of course written into the
Constitution.
Some of the Court’s brightest and most important moments
have come amid accusations of judicial policy setting, including
cases like Brown. 136 By the same token, some of the Court’s
lowest points, such as Korematsu v. United States, resulted from
the Court’s failure to inject itself into politically charged
issues.137 However, should the judicial branch be permitted to
set far reaching emissions restriction policy, it would be taking a
step beyond the purportedly “activist” decisions of The New Deal
era or the Warren Court.
As the District Court in Connecticut v. American Electric
Power Co. correctly noted, the relief sought by the plaintiffs in
that case would require the court to unilaterally set an
appropriate level of emissions reduction as well as setting a
schedule by which those reductions were to occur.138 Moreover,
any policy sufficient to redress the injuries claimed by the
plaintiffs would require, at a minimum, a broad-based decision
(or series of decisions) setting restrictions on many (or all)
domestic energy producers in order to make any measurable dent
on the consequences of global warming complained of by the
plaintiffs.139 In other words, contrary to the vehicles used by the
Warren Court in eliminating “separate but equal” education, the
judicial branch would not be simply evaluating actions taken by
the elected officials of the legislative branch and making a
decision to uphold or declare unconstitutional those actions.
Instead, the judicial branch would be required to set forth, in the
first instance, the policy options that should prevail in the
ongoing debate on global warming and the mechanisms which
should be implemented to achieve those policy goals.
Consider an analogy to what the Warren Court would have
had to undertake in Brown to match the largely legislative
function that the judicial branch would have to assume in the
global warming debate to determine the guiding policies for

136 Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
See generally Frank J. Macchiarola, Dorothy Kerzner
Lipsky, & Alan Gartner, The Judicial System & Equality in Schooling, 23 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 567 (1996).
137 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the executive order mandating Japanese
internment during World War II, specifically deferring to the determination made by
Congress and the President that such measures were warranted).
138 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
139 See supra Part II.A.
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emissions restrictions and implement the necessary changes in
one fell swoop. First, allowing the judiciary to determine that
domestic energy producers should be subject to emissions
restrictions without any legislative action setting forth this policy
would be akin to the Warren Court creating the concept of equal
protection on its own, rather than extracting it from the 14th
Amendment. There is no provision of legislatively enacted law to
support such a decree from the judiciary at this point in time.
Further, allowing the judiciary to set specific emissions
restrictions on specific domestic energy producers to combat
global warming would be the equivalent of the Supreme Court in
Brown requiring that “Topeka High School A is to consist of no
more than 70 percent white students, whereas Topeka High
School B is to consist of no more than 60 percent white students,
and Topeka High School C is to consist of no more than 65
percent white students.”
These, of course, were not the tactics taken by the Supreme
Court in Brown. Rather, after initially striking down segregated
education as unconstitutional under the equal protection clause
of the 14th Amendment, the Court set further hearing on the
matter of how to implement the necessary changes. 140 The
following year, the case came back to the Supreme Court in
Brown II.141 In that case, the Court recognized that the judicial
branch should not be charged with creating the programs to
implement desegregation.142 Rather, the Court held that “[f]ull
implementation of these constitutional principles may require
solution of varied local school problems. School authorities have
the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving
these problems; courts will have to consider whether the action of
school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the
governing constitutional principles.”143
The Brown and Brown II Courts followed a traditional
pattern of legislation and jurisprudence in the context of major
policy change.144 First, a legislative body enacts a law. Second, a
plaintiff damaged by the law challenges its validity before the
courts. Third, the courts are charged with evaluating the
validity of the law. Fourth, the courts either uphold or invalidate
the law. Fifth, if the courts invalidate the law, they allow for the
legislative branch (or if the legislative branch has delegated

Brown, 347 U.S. at 495–96.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
See id. at 299–301.
Id. at 299.
All of the New Deal and Warren Court decisions cited previously likewise conform
to this same traditional pattern.
140
141
142
143
144
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rulemaking to an agency, that agency) to amend the scheme to
bring it into compliance with the previously existing law, namely
in Brown, the 14th Amendment.
By contrast, judicial intervention into the global warming
debate steps far outside this framework. To date, no legislative
body has acted to set emissions restrictions for domestic energy
producers. Rather, through cases like Connecticut v. American
Electric Power Co., plaintiffs are attempting to fit an issue
requiring widespread legislation into common law doctrines such
as nuisance. 145 As such, rather than being charged with
evaluating the validity of a law enacted by the elected officials of
the legislature, the judicial branch, should it intervene, is instead
left to create not only its own policies, but also the mechanisms
for enforcing those policies.
In sum, the actions that would necessarily be undertaken by
the judiciary should it intervene in the global warming debate
and attempt to create its own set of emissions restrictions
without allowing for the other coordinate branches of government
to act would exceed the actions of even those courts long accused
of “judicial activism.” The courts would need to determine
whether emissions restrictions should be imposed on domestic
energy producers at all, and if so, such restrictions should be
imposed prior to the creation of a global emissions reduction
agreement and how the emissions restriction scheme should be
structured. These far reaching initial policy determinations that
would be required of the judiciary are precisely what the third
Baker factor is aimed to prevent, and so the political question
doctrine precludes judicial intervention in this debate absent
action by at least one of the other two branches of government.
3.

Although Setting Emissions Restrictions Through the
Judiciary Would Contravene the Political Question
Doctrine as Set Forth Above, Judicial Branch
Intervention in Setting Broad-Based Emissions
Restrictions Would Not Directly Conflict with the
Executive’s Constitutional Authority to Manage Foreign
Relations, and So Would Not Violate the First Baker
Factor
The first Baker factor precludes a court from intervening in a
dispute where the court’s decision would intrude on the
constitutional authority of a coordinate political branch to act.146
In the context of global warming, and the roundly recognized
145
146

Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 314 (2d Cir. 2009).
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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need for a global agreement, the Constitution commits the right
to negotiate and reach a global accord to the executive branch.147
However, because judicial intervention in setting emissions
restrictions would not directly interfere with the executive’s
ability to negotiate and enter such an agreement, it would not
contravene the first Baker factor despite arguments to the
contrary from the plaintiffs in American Electric Power Co.148
While the Second Circuit ultimately reached the correct
conclusion in American Electric Power Co., holding that the first
Baker factor would not be contravened by the court’s intervention
in the global warming debate,149 its reasoning is unpersuasive.
The court continually leaned upon the fact that courts have been
adjudicating environmental disputes for over a century.150 This
logic is insufficient to satisfy the real issues involving executive
authority to manage foreign relations in the context of entering
the dispute over global warming, as the issues presented by
global warming are distinguishable from the direct pollution
cases previously adjudicated by the courts.
As noted above, the environmental disputes previously
adjudicated by the judiciary involved discrete acts of pollution in
well defined geographical areas—and not just any well defined
geographical areas, but always domestic geographic areas. 151
When a factory in Tennessee was emitting noxious fumes into
Georgia causing damage to orchards and forests, the solution
involved resolving only a single dispute between two domestic
entities.152 Global warming and its consequences are different
monsters altogether.
Analysis of injuries directly and
immediately caused by actors and actions contained entirely
within the United States shed little light on the propriety of
judicial intervention in the worldwide problem of global
warming.153
Rather, global warming needs to be considered in the context
in which it is agreed it must be addressed in order to be effective.
Global change, not merely domestic change, is required. It has
long been the concern of Congress that enacting domestic
U.S. CONST . art. II, § 2; Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 325.
Id. at 325–26.
150 See, e.g., id. at 326–27.
151 E.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206
U.S. 230 (1907); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915); New Jersey v. City of
New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931).
152 Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230.
153 U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Climate Change-Health and
Environmental Effects: International Impacts, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/effects/
international.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).
147
148
149
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restrictions before a global agreement is reached could weaken
United States bargaining power, especially with respect to the
developing nations that are likely to see dramatic growth in the
level of harmful emissions generated. 154 Of particular concern
are India and China, who are rapidly ascending the list of largest
global polluters.155 In 1992, the House of Representatives
specifically found that domestic emissions reduction requires
should only be taken “in the context of concerted international
action.”156
However, as the court in American Electric Power Co.
correctly noted, this is not the type of “direct challenge” to an
action committed to another branch of government to which the
first Baker factor applies.157 In the cases leading up to and cited
by Baker as well as the cases decided in the four plus decades
since Baker, courts finding the existence of a non-justiciable
political question based on the first Baker factor have typically
done so only where resolution of the case would preclude another
branch of the government from undertaking an action
constitutionally committed to it, such as a court decision
recognizing a sovereign to the exclusion of the executive’s
authority to do so or precluding the executive from dispatching
Contrary to these examples, judicial
troops overseas. 158
regulation of emissions created by domestic energy producers
would not usurp the President’s authority to enter a global
agreement. While it would seem likely to reduce the President’s
bargaining power in negotiating such an agreement, this is
distinct from assigning to the courts a function constitutionally
committed to one of the other branches of government.
Because reduction in bargaining power in negotiating an
international agreement is not sufficient to be considered a
“direct challenge” to a function textually committed by the
Constitution to another branch of government, the first Baker
factor is not an impediment to judicial determination of

See H.R. REP. NO. 102-474 (I), Greenhouse Warming–Energy Implications (1992).
U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, 2006 TOTAL CARBON DIOXIDE
EMISSIONS FROM THE CONSUMPTION OF ENERGY, supra note 11 (reporting that, as of 2006,
China and India were the first and fourth largest emitters, respectively).
156 H.R. REP. NO. 102-474 (I), Greenhouse Warming—Energy Implications (1992).
157 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 325 n.3 (2d Cir. 2009).
158 E.g., Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) (demonstrating a plaintiff’s
attempt to challenge President’s determination that the Guano Islands were a territory of
the United States presented a non-justiciable political question); Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950) (stating that the attempted challenge to the President’s decision
to deploy troops in a foreign nation was non-justiciable political question); Can v. United
States, 14 F.3d 160, 162–63 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that the court could not make
determination of title to blocked South Vietnamese assets because it would preclude
President’s authority to recognize foreign governments).
154
155
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emissions restrictions, despite the argument to the contrary by
the energy producer defendants in American Electric Power Co.159
Rather, the problematic Baker factors are three, four, five and
six, as set forth above.160
C. The Solution is to Allow the Executive and/or Legislative
Branches to Act Before the Judicial Branch Becomes
Involved
The above analysis concluding that the judicial branch
should not be setting emissions restrictions on domestic energy
producers is not to suggest that emissions from domestic energy
producers cannot or should not be restricted, as certainly the vast
majority of scientific evidence points to climate change as a real
and serious problem with potentially devastating consequences.
However, instead of the judicial branch setting emission
standards either in one fell swoop or over time through piecemeal
litigation against specific contributing entities, courts should
refrain from entering the dispute until the executive reaches a
global accord ratified by the legislature which the legislature
passes laws or delegates the authority to enforce, or until the
legislature makes clear that a national policy of emissions
restrictions on domestic energy producers should be put in place
even prior to a global agreement.
Legislative action is precisely what occurred in
Massachusetts v. EPA.161 In that case, multiple states relied on
action taken by the legislative branch to attempt to compel the
EPA to regulate new motor vehicle carbon dioxide emissions.162
Congress enacted the Clean Air Act and charged the EPA with
designing mechanisms for its enforcement.163 The court was then
left to assume its traditional role of interpreting the laws enacted
by the legislature.
However, as noted above, the Clean Air Act does not
mandate restricting the carbon dioxide emissions of domestic
energy producers.164 While there is a strong push for a global
agreement emerging from the international community, few
would say that a comprehensive global agreement to which the
United States and other major emitters are likely to join is

159
160
161
162
163
164

Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 at 324–25.
See Part II.B.
127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006).
See 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006).
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imminent.165 Unless and until some global agreement is reached,
Congress would do well to make a determination as to which
policy course to take: either pass legislation preventing further
emissions restrictions until a global agreement is reached, or
press forward with domestic regulation despite the lack of an
international agreement.
III. HOW THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN CONNECTICUT V.
AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO. REMAINS USEFUL
Although the Second Circuit’s opinion holding that the
political question doctrine does not preclude courts from setting
emissions restrictions on defendant energy producers under the
common law nuisance doctrine should not withstand further
scrutiny, it remains a useful opinion in the race to mitigate the
consequences of global warming. This is because, as the law
currently stands (at least in the Second Circuit), the judicial
branch can now seemingly unilaterally impose emissions
restrictions on emitters of carbon dioxide without the influence of
either of the other two branches of government. 166 This is an
undesirable scenario for many important players in the global
climate change debate, and may help spur long awaited action by
the executive and legislative branches.
The energy lobby has long been accused of attempting to
prevent, delay or at a minimum, assure the energy industry
favorable terms in any comprehensive policy on climate
change. 167 Energy companies have committed large sums of
money to these causes. For instance, The American Coalition for
Clean Coal Electricity, an advocacy group consisting of 48 energy
producers, mining companies, and railroads, had committed
$9.95 million to those ends as of March 2009.168 Energy
producers routinely make large campaign contributions to highranking members of Congressional committees charged with
energy regulation and environmental action. For example, one of
the largest contributors during the 2009–2010 campaign cycle to
Rep. Joe Barton, Chairman of the House Committee on Energy &

165 See Bryan Walsh, Climate Accord Suggests a Global Will, if Not a Way, Feb. 2,
2010, TIME.COM, http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1958234,00.html.
166 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
167 Public Health and Natural Resources: A Review of the Implementation of Our
Environmental Laws: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong.,
2nd Sess., (2002) (testimony of Eric Shaeffer). Shaeffer, the former director of the Office
of Regulatory Enforcement at the EPA, testified that the “energy lobbyists . . . are
working furiously to weaken” regulation of emissions created by energy producers. Id.
168 Wayne Berman, Energy Reform: Heavy Hitters Seek to Sway Cap and Trade
Debate, F OXN EWS . COM, Mar. 12, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/03/12/
heavy-hitters-sway-cap-and-trade/.
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Commerce, is none other than American Electric Power Co., the
lead defendant in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co.169
The industries making the two largest contributions to Rep.
Barton are the lectric utilities and oil & gas industries.170
Given the aggressive attempts to influence climate change
legislation that the energy lobby has demonstrated, an event
causing energy producers to support emissions reduction
legislation would be significant in making progress in this area.
A decision authorizing piecemeal judicial regulation of emissions
could be such an event.
While the energy lobby has long resisted comprehensive
emissions reduction policies, if such policies are to be initiated, it
follows that energy producers would prefer they come from a
source over which influence can be asserted to assure favorable
terms. A judicially created emissions restriction seems to be a
worst case scenario for energy producers. Unlike the political
branches of government, the judiciary is intended to be beyond
reproach by lobbyists. Without the need for (or the ability to
accept) political contributions, the influence that can be asserted
over the judiciary should be markedly less than that over the
legislative process in Congress. The executive can be influenced
in a similar manner, especially a first-term President needing
cooperation on other major policy initiatives, including health
care reform.
However, with the potential for increased efforts by the
energy lobby to assert legislative or executive driven policies on
emissions reductions comes the increased risk that any such
policy will be too favorable to energy producers, and
correspondingly too lenient on emissions. This has already
proven to be an area for concern, as several notable pundits have
criticized the Waxman-Markey bill on this basis.171 An increased
focus from energy producers in achieving favorable terms could
exacerbate this issue.
While only time will tell the nature of the impact the Second
Circuit’s decision in American Electric Power Co., the decision
seems likely to shift the incentives for the energy industry
toward encouraging some action by the legislature and/or the
executive. The optimal scenario would seem to be a global

169 Joe Barton, OpenSecrets.org, http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/
summary.php?cid=N00005656&cycle=2010# (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
170 Id.
171 E.g., Press Release, Rep. Dennis Kucinich, Passing a Weak Bill Today Gives Us
Weak
Environmental
Policy
Tomorrow,
(June
25,
2009),
available
at
http://kucinich.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=134813.
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accord, followed by legislative action to enforce the terms of that
accord domestically. The courts would then be restored to their
customary role of adjudicating disputes over the meaning of the
global accord and the subsequent legislation passed by Congress,
rather than attempting to create policy in the first instance.
CONCLUSION
The time for significant new policy on climate change is now.
Widespread, dramatic reductions are required in order to reduce
the looming and potentially devastating consequences of global
warming. The judicial branch, along with the public, is rightfully
growing frustrated with the lack of action both internationally
and domestically. The Second Circuit has boldly asserted itself
as a decision-maker where Congress has been unwilling.
However, despite the fact that the world can no longer afford
to wait, the judicial branch is simply not the appropriate body to
set forth the policies that will govern the global warming crisis
going forward. While the Second Circuit’s decision should not
withstand further legal scrutiny, it may turn out to be an
underappreciated hero on climate change.

